Net losses: estimating the global cost of cybercrime by unknown
Net Losses:  
Estimating the Global  
Cost of Cybercrime 
Economic impact of cybercrime II
Center for Strategic and International Studies   
June 2014
02   |    Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime
Contents 
Estimating global loss from  
incomplete data 04 
Regional variations  08 
Incentives explain cybercrime’s growth  10 
Acceptable loss from cybercrime  11 
IP theft and innovation cannibalism  12
Penalty-free financial crime  14 
Confidential business information  
and market manipulation  15 
Opportunity cost and cybercrime  17 
Recovery costs  18 
The future: Storms ahead, and  
continued growth for cybercrime  18 
Appendix A: Economic impact  
of cybercrime  19
Appendix B: Total addressable market  
for cybersecurity  20
Appendix C: Cybercrime as a percent of GDP  21
Appendix D: Select bibliography  
on cybercrime  22
Cybercrime is a growth industry. 
The returns are great, and the risks 
are low. We estimate that the likely 
annual cost to the global economy 
from cybercrime is more than $400 
billion.1 A conservative estimate 
would be $375 billion in losses, while 
the maximum could be as much 
as $575 billion. Even the smallest 
of these figures is more than the 
national income of most countries 
and governments and companies 
underestimate how much risk they 
face from cybercrime and how 
quickly this risk can grow.1
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Putting a number on the cost of cybercrime and cyberespionage 
is the headline, but the dollar figure begs important questions 
about the damage to the victims from the cumulative effect 
of losses in cyberspace. The cost of cybercrime includes the 
effect of hundreds of millions of people having their personal 
information stolen—incidents in the last year include more than 
40 million people in the US, 54 million in Turkey, 20 million in 
Korea, 16 million in Germany, and more than 20 million in China. 
One estimate puts the total at more than 800 million individual 
records in 2013.2 This alone could cost as much as $160 billion 
per year.3 Criminals still have difficulty turning stolen data into 
financial gain, but the constant stream of news contributes to a 
growing sense that cybercrime is out of control. 
For developed countries, cybercrime has serious implications for 
employment.4 The effect of cybercrime is to shift employment 
away from jobs that create the most value. Even small changes in 
GDP can affect employment. In the United States alone, studies 
of how employment varies with export growth suggest that the 
losses from cybercrime could cost as many as 200,000 American 
jobs, roughly a third of 1% decrease in employment for the US.5 
Using European Union data, which found that 16.7 workers were 
employed per million Euros in exports to the rest of the world,6 
Europe could lose as many as 150,000 jobs due to cybercrime 
(adjusting for national differences in IP-intensive jobs), or about 
0.6% of the total unemployed. 
These are not always a “net” loss if workers displaced by cyber-
espionage find other jobs, but if these jobs do not pay as well or 
better. If lost jobs are in manufacturing (and “the main engine 
for job creation”7) or other high-paying sectors, the effect of 
cybercrime is to shift workers from high-paying to low-paying 
jobs or unemployment. While translating cybercrime losses di-
rectly into job losses is not easy, the employment effect cannot 
be ignored. 
The most important cost of cybercrime, however, comes from 
its damage to company performance and to national econo-
mies. Cybercrime damages trade, competitiveness, innovation, 
and global economic growth. What cybercrime means for the 
world is: 
• The cost of cybercrime will continue to increase as more 
business functions move online and as more companies and 
consumers around the world connect to the Internet.  
• Losses from the theft of intellectual property will also 
increase as acquiring countries improve their ability to make 
use of it to manufacture competing goods. 
• Cybercrime is a tax on innovation and slows the pace of 
global innovation by reducing the rate of return to innovators 
and investors. 
• Governments need to begin serious, systematic effort to 
collect and publish data on cybercrime to help countries and 
companies make better choices about risk and policy.
04   |    Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime
Estimating global loss from 
incomplete data  
Deciding what counts as cybercrime affects the size of any 
estimate. Our estimate looks at both direct and indirect costs, 
and data used that takes into account the loss of intellectual 
property, the theft of financial assets and sensitive business 
information, opportunity costs, additional costs for securing net-
works, and the cost of recovering from cyberattacks, including 
reputational damage to the hacked company. These additional 
indirect costs show the full effect of cybercrime on the global 
economy. International agreement on a standard definition of 
cybercrime would improve the ability to collect consistent data. 
That said, even a broad definition leaves out important nonmon-
etary effects on innovation, national defense, and the long-term 
competitiveness of both countries and companies.
Our sources range from the German Office for the Protection 
of the Constitution, the Netherlands Organisation for Applied 
Scientific Research (TNO), China’s Peoples Public Security 
University, the European Commission, the Australian Institute 
of Criminology Research, Malaysia’s Chief Technical Officer, and 
estimates by government agencies in other countries and con-
sulting and cybersecurity companies around the world. 
Simply listing known cybercrime and cyberespionage incidents 
creates a dramatic narrative. We found hundreds of reports of 
companies being hacked.8 In the US, for example, the govern-
ment notified 3,000 companies in 2013 that they had been 
hacked. Two banks in the Persian Gulf lost $45 million in a few 
hours.9 A British company reported that it lost $1.3 billion from a 
single attack.10 Brazilian banks say their customers lose millions 
annually to cyberfraud.11 India’s CERT reported that 308,371 
websites were hacked between 2011 and June 2013,12 and the 
Indian experience is not unique. Simply adding up the losses 
from the known incidents would total billions of dollars, but this 
provides an incomplete picture.  
Most cybercrime incidents go unreported. Few companies come 
forward with information on losses. When Google was hacked in 
2010, another 34 Fortune 500 companies in sectors as diverse 
as information technology and chemicals also lost intellectual 
property.13 Some of the information on the incident only came to 
light from documents made public by WikiLeaks. Only one other 
company reported that it had been hacked along with Google, 
and it supplied no details on the effect. Similarly, when a major 
US bank lost several million dollars in a cyberincident it publicly 
denied any loss, even when law enforcement and intelligence 
officials confirmed it in private. Few of the biggest cybercriminals 
have been caught or, in many cases, even identified. 
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The lack of data means that any dollar amount for the global 
cost of cybercrime is an estimate based on incomplete data. A 
few nations have made serious efforts to calculate their losses 
from cybercrime, but most have not. This study assumes that 
the cost of cybercrime is a constant share of national income, 
adjusted for levels of development. We calculated the likely 
global cost by looking at publicly available data from individual 
countries, buttressed by interviews with government officials and 
experts. We looked for confirming evidence for these numbers 
by looking at data on IP theft, fraud, or recovery costs. In addi-
tion to a mass of anecdotes, we ultimately found aggregate data 
for 51 countries in all regions of the world who account for 80% 
of global income. We used this data to estimate the global cost, 
adjusting for differences among regions.
There was considerable variation in losses among countries, 
but this is consistent with other studies (based on surveys of 
individual companies), which found that companies in different 
countries lost different amounts per cyberincident, with US 
companies losing the most. Explaining these variations lies 
beyond the scope of this report, but one possibility is that 
cybercriminals decide where to commit their crimes based on 
an assessment of the value of the target and the ease of entry. 
The combination of high value, low risk, and low “work factor” 
(the amount of effort it takes to break into a network) makes 
cybercrime a winning proposition.  
Not all data on cybercrime losses is of the same quality. For 
example, we found two divergent estimates for the European 
Union, one saying losses in the EU totaled only $16 billion, far 
less than the aggregate for those EU countries where we could 
find data, and another putting losses for the EU at close to a 
trillion dollars, more than we could find for the entire world. 
Japan is another interesting case. Credible survey data found 
that Japanese companies lost on average about half what US 
companies lost in hacking incidents, but if the rate of loss for 
Japanese companies is consistent with the rates for the US, 
China, or Germany, this means that the figure provided to us 
by officials from several ministries may underestimate the cost 
of cybercrime by two-thirds. The problem is even worse in the 
developing world, where most governments do not collect any 
data on cybercrime at all. 
G20 nations suffer the bulk of 
losses and losses from cybercrime 
for four largest economies in 
the world (the US, China, Japan, 
and Germany) reached $200 
billion. Low-income countries 
have smaller losses, but this 
will change as these countries 
increase their use of the Internet 
and as cybercriminals move to 
exploit mobile platforms.
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Why some nations lose more than others 
One factor explaining why some nations appear to lose more 
than others has nothing to do with cybercrime. Differences in 
the thoroughness of national accounting appear to explain the 
variation. The alternate explanation—that some countries are 
miraculously unaffected by cybercrime despite having no better 
defenses than countries with similar income levels that suffer 
higher loss—seems improbable. National accounts in general 
need to be updated to better capture the value of intangible 
goods and services, and better collection of statistics on cyber-
crime is essential for managing this problem. Work by govern-
ments to improve the collection of data on the cost of cyber-
crime would make a valuable contribution to our ability to make 
better choices about risk, investment, and policy.
The cost of stolen Intellectual property (IP) is the most difficult 
to estimate for the cost of cybercrime, but it is also the most 
important variable for determining loss. Valuing IP is complicat-
ed, but firms place a value on IP every day. Countries where IP 
creation and IP-intensive industries are important for wealth cre-
ation lose more in trade, jobs, and income from cybercrime than 
countries that depend more on agriculture, extractive industries, 
or low-level manufacturing. Those countries still suffer losses 
from financial crime and from the theft of business confidential 
information on production, prices, or crop expectations that 
could be useful in contract negotiations, but their overall loss  
will be smaller than that of IP-intensive economies.
Along with the difficulty of valuing IP, other intangible losses 
are not easily measured. In addition to losses in business and 
consumer confidence, the effect of cyberespionage on national 
security is significant, and the monetary value of the military 
technology taken likely does not reflect the full cost to the na-
tion. Underreporting and the difficulty of valuing IP are the most 
significant problems for estimating the cost of cybercrime. CERT 
Australia, for example, found that only 44% of victim compa-
nies reported the attacks,14 and researchers in the Netherlands 
found a similar rate of underreporting. Many companies either 
don’t know or won’t report their losses. There are perfectly 
sound business reasons for this, but it produces an inherent bias 
towards underestimation. 
A separate set of problems can be traced to the wide gap be-
tween what cybercriminals take and what they gain. This is true 
for both the theft of IP and many financial crimes and compli-
cates estimation for key categories of cybercrime. We all know 
that a stolen bicycle may be a $500 loss for the owner and a $50 
gain for the thief. The calculation is even more uncertain where 
cybercrime is concerned. Even if we know what was taken, in 
cases involving personally identifiable information or IP, crimi-
nals can’t make use of all they have taken. It is harder (in some 
cases, much harder) to monetize the result of a successful hack 
than it is to the hack itself. Millions of individuals can lose their 
credit card data in a single incident, but only a fraction of those 
affected will experience financial loss. 
There are wide fluctuations in available national estimates. 
High-income countries lost more as a percent of GDP, perhaps 
as much as 0.9% on average. This may simply reflect better 
accounting, but rampant underreporting means that actual 
losses may be higher. For developing economies where IP plays 
a smaller economic role, the losses averaged 0.2% of GDP. The 
average loss among all countries for which we found data was 
0.5% of GDP. Countries in Europe and North America lost more 
while countries in Latin American and Africa lost less. This may 
simply reflect better accounting in these countries, but it could 
also suggest that actual global losses may be higher than our 
estimate. The disparities we found are explained in part by the 
fact that the best hackers prefer to target richer countries. 
The lack of broadband connectivity also affects the amount of 
cybercrime—one official we interviewed said that once a country 
(in Africa) gets broadband connectivity, usually without adequate 
defenses, cybercrime spikes within a few days. The overall effect 
of the spike on global losses is limited, as the less developed 
countries do not generate the bulk of global income, but the re-
gional effect is significant. Wealthier countries are more attractive 
targets for hackers but they also have better defenses. Less-de-
veloped countries are more vulnerable. 
Extrapolating a global loss figure 
If we used the loss by high-income countries to extrapolate a 
global figure, this would give us a global total of $575 billion. An-
other approach would be to take the total amount for all coun-
tries where we could find open source data and use it to extrapo-
late global costs. This would give us a total global cost of around 
$375 billion. A third approach would be to aggregate costs as a 
share of regional incomes to get a global total. This would give 
us an estimate of $445 billion. None of these approaches are 
satisfactory, but until reporting and data collection improve, 
they provide a way to estimate the global cost of cybercrime and 
cyberespionage. 
Given the wide variation in estimates of loss and the difficulty 
of valuing IP, it is possible that we have overestimated the cost 
of cybercrime and cyberespionage, but the wealth of anecdotal 
data on the number of incidents and their effect suggests oth-
erwise. If anything, data on crimes related to the theft of “intan-
gible” sources of value suggest it is more likely that we have un-
derestimated the effect. These intangible costs include the loss 
of military advantage by the victim country, increased military 
advantage for the acquiring nation, and the costs to repairing any 
damage. They also include increased competition for interna-
tional arms sales, as the acquiring nation’s products improve in 
quality. For example, press reports suggest that intrusion into an 
American advanced fighter aircraft program led to cost increas-
es in the tens of millions of dollars and delays as software was 
rewritten or replaced.15 
Studies estimate that the Internet 
economy annually generates 
between $2 trillion and $3 trillion, 
a share of the global economy that 
is expected to grow rapidly. If our 
estimates are right, cybercrime 
extracts between 15% and 20% of 
the value created by the Internet.
The cost of stolen 
intellectual property  
is the most difficult  
to estimate for the  
cost cybercrime.
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Unsurprisingly, North America, Europe, and Asia lost the most, 
while Africa lost the least. Income levels are a good predictor of 
cybercrime, as wealthier countries (or firms) are more likely to  
be targets—it takes roughly the same amount of work to hack 
rich and poor targets, but rich targets produce a better return  
on effort.
There are strong correlations between national income levels 
and losses from cybercrime. It is not surprising to find that places 
with more money are more likely to be robbed if they are no 
more secure than places with less money. The best explanation is 
that since the risk for cybercriminals is the same whether they go 
after a rich target or a poor one (small in both cases), they nat-
urally gravitate to the places where value online is highest. This 
may change as low-income countries increase their access and 
use of the Internet for commercial purposes and as cybercrim-
inals continue to refocus their activities onto mobile platforms, 
the preferred source for connectivity in the developing world. 
There are important variations within regions. Brazil, Mexico, 
and Argentina are the most affected countries in Latin America, 
according to the Amparo Project of the regional Internet Service 
Provider organization LACNIC.16 A survey of Brazilian companies 
found that a third had been victims of cybercrime. Dr. Marcos 
Tupinamba, a Brazilian information security expert estimates that 
at least 5% of Brazilian companies suffer monetary losses from 
cybercrime; the number of attempts is, of course, far greater. 
In February of 2012, a group calling itself “Anonymous Brasil” 
launched a denial-of-service attack, which took down a num-
ber of Brazilian financial websites, including that of Citigroup.17 
In another attack, Brazilian hackers compromised 4.5 million 
home DSL routers.18 Using the hacked routers and careful social 
engineering, the criminals encouraged users to provide sensitive 
personal information or to install malware. 
Like many computer-literate countries, Brazil’s hacker com-
munity is active and sophisticated. Brazilian hackers’ social 
engineering skills and the lack of security awareness among 
companies and consumers explains cybercrime losses in Brazil. 
Confidence ranking: Countries current tracking  
of cybercrime within their borders
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Many experts agree that Brazil’s weak laws for cybercrime and 
intellectual property protec ion means that domestic hackers, 
who have become increasingly professionalized, face little 
risk of arrest or prosecution.19 These factors make Brazilian 
cybercriminals successful locally, but there is little to prevent 
them from turning to a global crime. Brazil also faces external 
cyberthreats, and information on the Brazilian economy from 
key crops—from soybeans to oil production—are targets.
Among high-income countries, Germany and the Netherlands 
had higher than average losses (as a percent of GDP). Japan and 
Australia had lower than average losses. This probably reflects 
difference in the methodologies used to calculate cost, along 
with difficulties in acquiring information from companies on 
losses (something that officials in all countries we interviewed 
complained about). Japanese officials also say that the difficulty 
for foreign hackers to understand Japanese provided a natu-
ral layer of defense. It is easier to estimate IP losses for the US 
because its government has made a significant effort to identify 
what IP foreign hackers have taken. 
Just as the G20 produces the bulk of global income, the G20 
suffers the bulk of losses from cybercrime and cyberespionage. 
Interestingly, the rate of loss from cybercrime was roughly the 
same (as a percentage of GDP) among three of the four largest 
economies in the world (the US, China, and Germany).20 These 
countries lost more than $200 billion to cybercrime. In contrast, 
few low-income countries had data on losses and the few where 
we were able to find data had small losses as a percent of 
national GDP. This will change as low-income countries increase 
their access to and use of the Internet for commercial purposes 
and as cybercriminals continue to refocus their activities onto 
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Incentives explain  
cybercrime’s growth  
The incentives in cybercrime are classic in that they encour-
age attack and discourage defense. Cybercrime produces high 
returns at low risk and (relatively) low cost for the hackers. The 
two most common exploitation techniques—social engineering, 
where a cybercriminal tricks a user into granting access, and 
vulnerability exploitation, where a cybercriminal takes advantage 
of a programming or implementation failure to gain access—are 
both surprisingly cheap. Criminals know that risk and cost are 
low while rewards are high. The rate of return on cybercrime fa-
vors the criminal; the incentive is to steal more. The rate of return 
per victim on cybercrime can be very low, but because the costs 
and risks of engaging in it are even lower, cybercrime remains an 
irresistible criminal activity. 
The opposite is true for defenders. The response to cybercrime 
is a business decision. Companies and individuals make deci-
sions on how to manage the potential for loss from cybercrime 
by deciding how much risk they are willing to accept and how 
much they are willing to spend to reduce that risk. The problem 
with this is that if companies are unaware of their losses or un-
derestimate their vulnerability, they will underestimate risk. 
Several factors determine the risk that a company will be a victim 
of cybercrime. These include the ease of penetrating the target 
networks and the attractiveness of the target to hackers (deter-
mined by its value found on its networks). As people, businesses, 
and governments become more reliant on computer networks 
and devices, as more economic value is digitized and stored 
on networks, as manufacturing capabilities increase around the 
world, losses from cybercrime will grow if there is no improvement 
in international cooperation. 
Hackers see low risk from cybercrime, with the added benefit 
that as manufacturing and research capabilities improve around 
the world, the return on stealing IP will increase, giving people 
more reason to hack—better indigenous manufacturing ca-
pabilities mean a greater return from hacking. Defenders lack 
the incentive to do more because they underestimate risk; the 
incentive for cybercriminals is to do more, as the rate of return is 
increasing. Absent a change in the incentives equation, the loss 
from cybercrime will increase. 
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Acceptable loss from cybercrime  
Our initial report suggested that countries will tolerate malicious 
activity as long as it stays at acceptable levels, less than 2% of 
national income. If cybercrime and cyberespionage cost more 
than 2% of GDP, we assume it would prompt much stronger calls 
for action as companies and societies find the burden unac-
ceptable. With that as a starting point, we compared losses from 
cybercrime to losses from other kinds of crime and mishaps to 
set upper and lower bounds for credible estimates of cybercrime 
losses. This helped us identify credible estimates. 
Our May 2013 report set upper and lower “bounds” for the 
cost of cybercrime by comparing it to other kinds of crime and 
loss. We used several analogies where other organizations have 
quantified the costs. These provide an idea of the scope of the 
problem, allowing us to set a ceiling and a floor for the cost 
of cybercrime. Analogies are a “proxy” number rather than a 
direct measurement. In our first report, we looked at car crash-
es, maritime piracy, “pilferage,” and the drug trade. The costs 
these imposed on society average roughly about 1% of national 
income. Using these analogies we decided that it was unlikely 
that cybercrime cost more than $600 billion, the estimated cost 
of the global drug trade. 
One way to think about the costs of cybercrime is that societies 
bear the cost of crime and loss as part of doing business and a 
tradeoff for convenience and efficiency. Companies and individu-
als have decided that the net gain of using automobiles and giant 
merchant ships outweigh the potential cost. The problem with 
these analogies is that many companies do not know the extent 
of their losses from cybercrime, leading them to make the wrong 
decisions about what is an acceptable loss. 
It is worth asking if money is the right metric. There are intangi-
ble costs that may not be captured by monetary losses. Business 
and consumer confidence could be one such cost, although it 
seems unlikely. The effect on national security is another, where 
the monetary value of the military technology taken likely 
does not reflect the full cost to the nation. In both cases, we 
can imagine a model that estimates how much Internet use or 
military investments would be worth if they were unaffected by 
cybercrime. Our assumption is that businesses, consumers, and 
governments implicitly accept a lower expected value for future 
cyberactivities because of the risk of loss and change or reduce 
their investments and activities accordingly. The question this 
report raises is whether those company assessments of risk are 
accurate or if they underestimate the effect of cybercrime. 
Activity Cost As % of GDP
Maritime Piracy 0.02% (global)
Transnational Crime 1.2% (global)
Counterfeiting/Piracy 0.89% (global)
Pilferage 1.5% (US)
Car Crashes 1.0% (US)
Narcotics 0.9% (global)
Cybercrime 0.8% (global)
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IP theft and innovation cannibalism  
Cybercrime damages innovation. A company invests in research 
and development (R&D) to create new intellectual property (IP). 
They expect a certain return from their investment. If a compet-
ing product based on stolen IP appears in the market (an im-
portant qualification, as all stolen IP can be used), the expected 
return to the developer will be smaller than expected. In most 
cases, the value of research and development is the head start 
it gives companies in the market. New products and features at-
tract new customers until competitors catch up. If the research 
is stolen, and the lead lasts only three months rather than a 
year, then the return on investment is a quarter of what it would 
have been absent cybercrime. 
IP theft can range from paint formulas to rockets. The loss 
from IP theft is also the most difficult component of the cost 
of cybercrime to estimate. Valuing IP is an art form, based on 
estimating the future revenue IP will produce, or the value the 
market places on IP (which are not always the same). The actual 
value of intellectual property can be quite different from the 
research and development costs incurred in creating it. Hackers 
can take a company’s product plans, its research results, and its 
customer lists, but the company may not even know that it has 
suffered loss. 
Putting a dollar figure on IP is a normal practice in pricing a 
company for sale or merger. These calculations can be based on a 
prediction of how much future income the IP will produce or how 
much it would fetch if offered for sale. These estimates provide a 
guide for estimating loss, but companies may not know what has 
been taken and the cybercriminals may not be able to make full 
use of what they have taken. Valuing IP is one of the hardest prob-
lems for estimating the cost of cybercrime, but it is not impossible. 
As cybertheft of IP becomes a recognized part of the business 
landscape, we can expect merger and acquisition (M&A) specialists 
to develop better tools for evaluating both the risk of compromise 
and the risk of successful exploitation by competitors. 
The cost to companies varies from among sector and by the 
ability to monetize stolen data (whether it is IP or business 
confidential information). Although all companies face the 
risk of loss of intellectual property and confidential business 
information, some sectors—finance, chemicals, aerospace, 
energy, defense, and IT—are more likely to be targeted and face 
attacks that persist until they succeed. Losses are higher for 
sectors where it is easier to monetize the stolen data, as with 
the chemical industry, where proprietary formulas can be easily 
duplicated or with sensitive business information on business 
negotiations. A former German intelligence official told us that 
“first [hackers] hollowed out our clean energy industry; now they 
are going after our car companies.” 
The most important loss from cybercrime is in the theft of IP and 
business confidential information, as this has the most significant 
economic implications. IP theft is a central problem for the in-
formation economy and not limited to cybercrime. A US Depart-
ment of Commerce report found that IP theft (all kinds, not just 
cybercrime) costs US companies $200 to $250 billion annually.21 
The Organization for Economic Development (OECD) estimat-
ed that counterfeiting and piracy costs companies as much as 
$638 billion per year.22 Hacking to steal IP is an outgrowth of two 
larger problems: the vulnerable nature of the Internet and weak 
protections for IP in many countries. Putting the two together 
creates a global problem. IP is a major source of competitive 
advantage for companies and for countries. The loss of IP means 
fewer jobs and fewer high-paying jobs in victim countries. The 
effect of IP theft is to subsidize competitors and hurt competi-
tiveness. IP theft from cybercrime works against innovation and 
slows the global rate of technological improvement. 
We know that balanced IP protection incentivizes growth. This is 
why nations have, for 150 years, put in place agreements to pro-
tect IP. Weak IP protections reduce growth and IP theft over the 
Internet by increasing the scale of theft to unparalleled propor-
tions; this both lowers and distorts global economic growth. By 
eroding IP protection, the effect of cybercrime is to depress the 
overall global rate of innovation while also reducing the ability of 
companies to gain the full return from their inventions, so they 
turn to other activities to make a profit. The impact of IP theft is 
not only to shift returns away from innovators, but also to reduce 
the overall rate of innovation. The beneficiary of IP theft grows 
somewhat faster, but the rest of the world grows more slowly.
Even the beneficiary of IP theft may suffer in the long run. Com-
panies that benefit from stolen IP have less reason to invest in 
R&D. More importantly, they may never learn how to effectively 
manage R&D investments. For example, rather than invest in 
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R&D, a company could rely on cyberespionage to gain new IP. 
Even if a company invests in R&D, it might use cyberespionage as 
a crutch if it ran into insurmountable technical problems, stealing 
a solution rather than creating the processes, internal research 
disciplines, and making the investments needed for innovation. 
That works until the other companies wise up or go bankrupt. A 
thief whose victims go broke is likely to starve along with them.
The result is to reduce returns to IP creators, since they will face 
competing products and get a smaller than expected revenues. 
A study23 by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
found that the global IP market now produces $180 billion a 
year in fees and royalties. This means that the lost revenues from 
the theft of IP through hacking could be almost as much as the 
value of legitimate IP transactions. The effect of smaller returns 
is to diminish investment in R&D. One way to think about the 
cost from cybercrime is to ask how investors would react if the 
returns on IP and innovation were doubled.24 Companies would 
invest more in R&D, and the global rate of innovation and tech-
nological improvement would increase. By eroding the returns 
on IP, cybercriminals hurt the victim company, but also their own 
country (which has less incentive to build an innovation infra-
structure) and the world. 
Given the nature of IP, however, this damage can be almost 
invisible to the victims. There is usually a delay between when 
IP is taken and when a competing product appears, although 
this varies among industry sectors. The delay between theft and 
production can be measured in years for technology products. 
Unlike the theft of a physical product, the company that created 
the IP is not prevented from making use of it after it has been 
taken, and so it cannot identify, let alone estimate, its losses. The 
man whose bicycle is stolen knows exactly what he has lost the 
next morning. The factory owner whose bicycle plans are stolen 
doesn’t know he’s lost anything until his competitor’s bicycle 
reaches the market. 
This means that companies underestimate loss and therefore 
underestimate their risk. Nortel’s patents brought in $4.5 billion 
when they were sold.25 Nortel has suffered for years from cyber-
espionage, with cyberspies sitting unnoticed on their networks 
for months at a time—this helps give an idea of the cost to an 
individual firm. Another firm with 800 employees had to cut its 
workforce in half after hackers stole its IP and a competing prod-
uct appeared on the market.26 
The limiting factor on the damage from IP theft is the ability of 
the acquirer to actually use the stolen technology. In the chem-
ical sector, for example, the loss of a formula for a particular 
product can allow a competitor to quickly introduce a competing 
and potentially lower-cost product. Chemical companies are 
among the top targets for cybereconomic espionage. In sectors 
where advanced manufacturing capabilities are required, such as 
semiconductors or jet engines, it may be years before the theft 
of intellectual property produces a competing product. The value 
of stolen IP might be zero in the first few years only to increase 
dramatically when the acquirer gains the ability to use it. 
One reason that the loss has been so great comes from the 
involvement and support of governments in the theft of IP and 
business confidential information. We can take as given—espe-
cially after Snowden—that nations spy on each other and have 
some idea of what others have been able to extract from their 
national networks. When senior US cybersecurity officials say 
that hacking is the greatest transfer of wealth in human history, 
they are basing that assertion on their inside knowledge of what 
has been taken from American companies and been copied onto 
another intelligence agency’s servers. Hundreds of thousands of 
pages of designs, business plans, blueprints, and other forms or 
intellectual property have been taken from companies. 
Some argue that the damage from espionage is tolerable, part of 
the cost of doing business in the world’s fastest growing markets, 
and that companies in developed countries can “run faster,” to 
create new technologies and so minimize any loss. There is an 
economic rationale for this, in that near-term gain for an individ-
ual firm outweighs long-term costs. But several dubious assump-
tions underlie this defense. Illicit technology transfer, even if the 
technology is dated by Western standards, accelerates military 
modernization. It accelerates improvement in indigenous indus-
trial and technological capabilities, making the recipient better 
able to absorb stolen technology and faster at creating competi-
tive products. On a national scale, IP theft translates into damage 
to trade balances, national income, and jobs. The theft of IP is 
a kind of immediate subsidy to the acquirer and distorts trade 
balances and national employment. Countries, like companies, 
have likely underestimated the risk they face.
US Department of Commerce 
report found that IP theft (all 
kinds, not just cybercrime) costs 
US companies $200 to $250 
billion annually. The Organization 
for Economic Development (OECD) 
estimated that counterfeiting and 
piracy costs companies as much  
as $638 billion per year.
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Penalty-free financial crime  
Financial crime—the theft of financial assets through 
cyberintrusions—is the second largest source of direct loss 
from cybercrime. It is a high-profile crime. When millions of 
people have their credit card information stolen by hackers, it 
gets immediate attention. Privacy laws that require reporting 
when personal information is compromised mean that there are 
numerous anecdotes of successful attacks. These attacks can 
cost the victim companies more than $100 million in recovery 
costs for large incidents, even if the actual amount gained by 
cybercriminals is much smaller.
The best data on cybercrime, unsurprisingly, comes from the 
financial sector, which is regulated, pays serious attention to 
cybersecurity, and can easily measure loss. In Mexico, banks lose 
up to $93 million annually just to online fraud.27 The National 
Police Agency estimates that Japanese banks lose about $110 
million annually. The 2013 hack against the US retailer Target, 
alone cost banks more than $200 million, and this does not 
count associated costs for the retailer and its customers.28 High-
profile cyberheists that garner tens of millions of dollars from 
banks get a lot of attention and are a global phenomenon. 
Financial crime usually involves fraud, but this can take many 
forms to exploit consumers, banks, and government agencies. 
The most damaging financial crimes seek to penetrate bank 
networks, with cybercriminals gaining access to accounts and 
siphoning money. Extortion, which appears to be more common 
outside of North America (and is a growing crime in India—one 
report stated, “India appears to be the ‘ransomware’ capital 
of Asia Pacific”) can involve threats to either disclose stolen 
information or shut down critical services if the criminal is not 
paid. Sometimes the payments can run into the hundreds of 
thousands of dollars.
Retailers are a favorite target for cybercriminals. In 2013, a series 
of high-loss attacks added to a list of past attacks that includes 
TJ Maxx, Sony, and others. UK retailers reportedly lost more than 
$850 million in 2013. Similar large-scale attacks have occurred 
against retailer, hotel chains, media companies, an airline, and 
financial service companies in Australia, with losses averaging 
more than $100 million per company. Stolen personally identifi-
able information (PII) and credit card data are hard to monetize, 
but cybercriminals appear to be getting better at this. While tens 
of millions of individuals have had their data compromised, the 
numbers of cases where these compromises have led to financial 
loss are lower. Cybercriminals can use the PII themselves, or they 
can sell it on the black market to groups who specialize in exploit-
ing stolen information. 
The theft of financial assets can be easiest to monetize, particu-
larly when a criminal can transfer funds directly to an account they 
control. In other cases, cybercriminals must rely on an intermedi-
ary to monetize their crime. They use “mules” or “cashers” (low-
end criminals used to monetize stolen information) to launder 
money, often relatives or acquaintances of the hackers, or mules 
can be people hired under false pretenses who think they are 
working for a legitimate company. The hackers will transfer funds 
to the mules’ accounts; the mules will take a “commission” (often 
between 5% to 10% of the total) and forward the rest to overseas 
accounts. The theft of $45 million from two banks in the Middle 
East involved the recruitment and use of 500 mules around the 
world, in this case, by using cloned debit cards to withdraw money 
from ATMs, keep a portion for themselves, and send the rest back 
to the hackers.29 Cybercriminals will drain an account, and then 
they access bank networks to replenish it and drain it again.30
These crimes are carried out by professional gangs, some with 
significant organizational abilities. One European intelligence 
official told us that there are “20 to 30 cybercrime groups” in the 
former Soviet Union that have “nation-state level” capacity. These 
groups have repeatedly shown that they can overcome almost 
any cyberdefense. Financial crime in cyberspace now occurs at 
industrial scale. 
Countries, like  
companies have likely 
underestimated the  
risk they face.
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Confidential business information 
and market manipulation  
The theft of confidential business information is the third largest 
cost from cybercrime and cyberespionage. Business confiden-
tial information can be turned into immediate gain. The loss of 
investment information, exploration data, and sensitive commer-
cial negotiation data can be used immediately. The damage to 
individual companies runs into the millions of dollars. Hacking of 
central banks or finance ministries could provide valuable eco-
nomic information on the direction of markets or interest rates. 
One European company told of going to negotiate a contract 
only to find that the other side already knew their bottom line. 
The company later discovered that it had been hacked. The CEO 
of a major oil company said privately that the loss of oilfield ex-
ploration data by hacking cost the company hundreds of millions 
of dollars. The director of a European security service described 
cyberespionage as a “normal business practice” in some parts of 
the world.31
One example would involve the theft of sensitive negotiating data 
that would give one party an advantage in a business deal. One 
UK company told British officials that it incurred revenue losses of 
$1.3 billion through the loss of intellectual property and disadvan-
tages in commercial activities. 
Anecdotes about loss come from every major economy. In 
2010, three leading Australian mining firms were hit by cyber-
attacks that disrupted operations and, in one instance, were 
used to gain confidential information related to major contract 
negotiations.32 Australian authorities said there were more than 
200 attempts to hack into one mining company’s networks that 
began with the onset of contract negotiations and continued 
for their duration. Similar stories from companies in the US, 
Europe, Asia, and Latin America are easy to find. Loss of client 
information is the biggest cost involved for Indian companies.33 
A BBC report found that cybercrime could cost Indian compa-
nies as much as 5% of their profits.34 
Stock market manipulation is a growth area for cybercrime. By 
breaking into a company’s networks or into the networks of its 
lawyers or accountants (which can sometimes be an easier tar-
get), cybercriminals can acquire inside information on acquisition 
and merger plans, quarterly revenue reports, or other data that 
could affect a company’s stock prices. Criminals taking advantage 
of this information for trading could be hard to detect, as it might 
look like a normal trade, especially if it was carried out in another 
stock market. Using chat rooms and social media for “pump and 
dump,” is a well-established technique, with criminals providing 
false information about a company’s prospects and then cashing 
in when the market reacts. Turkey’s financial regulators, for ex-
ample, found suspicious activity intended to manipulate markets 
and stock prices that went beyond “pump and dump” schemes.35 
For high-end cybercriminals, cybercrime may be morphing into 
financial manipulation that will be exceptionally difficult  
to detect. 
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Opportunity cost and cybercrime  
Opportunity cost is the value of forgone activities—opportunities 
or benefits that cannot be realized because resources have been 
expended elsewhere. Three kinds of opportunity costs deter-
mine the losses from cybercrime: reduced investment in R&D, risk 
averse behavior by businesses and consumers that limits Internet 
use, and increased spending on network defense. 
For companies, the largest opportunity cost may be in the money 
spent to secure their networks. While companies would always 
spend on security even if risk in the digital environment was 
greatly reduced, there is a “risk premium” that they pay for using 
an inherently insecure network. The rate at which spending on 
cybersecurity increases reflects not only an increased use of 
network technologies, but also an increased awareness of the 
threat. We can use the rate of change in cybersecurity spending as 
an indicator of opportunity cost and a “risk premium.” For exam-
ple, if companies spent $1 dollar in 2011 on cybersecurity, they 
increased this to $1.15 in 2012. By comparison, companies spend 
much less than 1%36 of the total values of shipping to protect 
themselves from maritime piracy. 
Another way to look at the opportunity cost of cybercrime is to 
see it as a share of the Internet economy. Studies estimate that the 
Internet economy annually generates between $2 trillion and $3 
trillion,1 a share of the global economy that is expected to grow 
rapidly. If our estimates are right, cybercrime extracts between 
15% and 20% of the value created by the Internet, a heavy tax on 
the potential for economic growth and job creation and a share 
of revenue that is significantly larger than any other transnational 
criminal activity. 
IDC estimates that the total addressable market (a measure of 
market size) for cybersecurity products and services has increased 
by 8.7% since 2011, from $53 billion to $58 billion in 2013 
(see Appendix B). Business demand for cybersecurity products 
increased by 14.7% in the same period, and consumer demand 
increased by 10.7%. Much of this growth is the result of the 
increased awareness of cybersecurity risks among firms. As 
awareness of cyberrisks grows, companies can better assess 
risk and spend more to manage, but if the problem were getting 
smaller, the market would be shrinking. Companies will keep 
spending to secure their networks no matter what, but smart 
companies realize they must spend more than they would 
otherwise. The real cost is measured by looking at the additional 
amount they have to spend. Judging from the growth in 
cybersecurity spending, this could be $10 billion more annually  
in addition to the monetary losses from cybercrime. 
Cybercriminals do not always seek to extract value from their 
attacks. A cybercriminal can use an Internet attack to disrupt the 
provision of a key service. We saw this in 2012, when criminals 
permanently erased the data from 30,000 computers at a large oil 
producer and launched similarly disruptive attacks against South 
Korean banks and media outlets that also erased the data on 
thousands of hard drives.37 These companies and their customers 
experienced harm that went beyond the cost of cleaning up and 
repair. The threat of service disruption can be part of an extortion 
scheme or a potential area of risk for some critical infrastructure. 
Numerous surveys of companies have also found that the cost 
of recovering from cyberattacks, including reputational damage, 
where the trust in a company decreases and their brand loses 
value, is also increasing.38 A 2012 survey estimated, based on the 
value that victims of cybercrime placed on time lost due to the 
incident, that this amounted to an additional $274 million to the 
hacked company. 
The opportunity cost arising from the failure to take full advantage 
of information technology is harder to measure. The use of IT in 
healthcare has been slowed by the fear, valid or not, that health 
information could be stolen, patient data could be manipulated, 
and devices interfered with by hackers. The same may prove to be 
true for self-driving automobiles and other valuable technologies.
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Recovery costs   
Cleaning up in the aftermath of cybercrime is expensive, often 
more expensive than the crime itself. The cost to individual com-
panies of recovery from cyberfraud or data breaches is increasing. 
While we know criminals will not be able to monetize everything 
that they steal, the victim has to spend as if they could monetize 
all the data or PII that was taken. As with spending on security, the 
aggregate cost to nations may be higher than monetary losses or 
the gain to cybercriminals. 
One study of the cost of cybercrime for Italy found that while the 
actual losses were only $875 million, the recovery and oppor-
tunity costs reached $8.5 billion.39 The effect on a business can 
include damage to brand and other reputational losses and harm 
to customer relations and retention. In the UK, 93% of large cor-
porations and 87% of small businesses reported a cyberbreach in 
the past year, with a breach estimated to cost large companies as 
much as $1.4 million and small companies more than $100,000.40 
The cost of the cleanup of a cyberincident is made public in many 
cases. The range of expenditures can be great (from $3 million 
for the State of Utah to $171 million for Sony Corporation). One 
estimate puts the losses to the retail chain, Target, as up to $420 
million, including reimbursement, the cost of reissuing millions of 
cards, legal fees, and credit monitoring for millions of customers.41 
Companies experience reduced valuation after they have been 
hacked. The effect on stock prices can be significant—a fall in 
value of between 1% and 5%—but the decline is not permanent, 
and prices usually recover within a quarter or two. This stock price 
recovery may change in the future if companies are required to re-
port major hacking incidents and describe what has actually been 
lost. There is also a possibility best practices and standards of care 
for cybersecurity become more common, companies may face 
increased liability and lawsuits over a lack of due diligence.42
The future: storms ahead, and 
continued growth for cybercrime    
If this were a static situation, we could say that cybercrime is 
just another social ill, diverting at most an eighth of a percent of 
global income from legitimate to illegal activities. This picture 
is wrong. First, as more business activities move online and as 
more consumers around the world connect to the Internet, and 
as autonomous devices are connected (“the Internet of things”), 
the opportunities for cybercrime will grow. Cybercrime remains 
a growth industry. Second, losses stemming from the theft of IP 
will also increase as acquiring countries improve their ability to 
make use of it to produce competing goods.
This means that companies that fail to adequately protect their 
networks will be at an increasing competitive disadvantage. 
There are also costs to nations in jobs and trade balances, and a 
global cost as cybercrime slows the pace of global innovation by 
reducing the rate of return to innovators and investors. Countries 
that can’t strengthen their cyberdefenses will be at a disadvan-
tage. Over time, if nothing else changes, losses from cybercrime 
will grow. 
Predicting the future becomes a comparison of probabilities—
the probability of improved defense and better international co-
operation compared to the probability of increased development 
around the world. The latter is certain; the former remain an area 
for additional work. It seems safe to say that even if the level of 
loss from financial crime remains constant, the level of loss from 
IP theft can only increase.
The situation is not irreparable, however, and it is worth asking 
what would change this picture. Better technology and stronger 
defenses could reduce the loss from cybercrime. Agreement and 
application of standards and best practices for cybersecurity 
could also reduce the cost of cybercrime. International agree-
ment on law enforcement and on state behavior that included 
restraints on crime could also reduce losses, particularly if this 
included agreement to observe existing international commit-
ments (such as World Trade Organization [WTO] commitments 
to protect IP). Making progress on these changes will require 
governments to do a better job accounting for loss and com-
panies to do a better job assessing risk. These are well within 
the realm of the possible if people decide to treat cybercrime 
seriously and take action against it. 
Absent these changes, we think there are two possible outcomes. 
In the first, the cost of crime for developed countries would stay 
largely flat, at least as a percentage of GDP, but the global cost 
would increase as new entrants and developing countries accel-
erate their use of the Internet. In the second, the cost to devel-
oped economies would increase as even more activities move 
online and as hackers improve their ability to monetize what they 
can steal. We do not see a credible scenario in which cybercrime 
losses diminish. The outlook for the world is increased losses 
and slower growth. 
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Brazil has been undergoing profound changes in the last 30 years, with 
the democratization of the country in the 1980s, inflation stabilization 
during the administration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the 
1990s, and more recently with social policies that were expanded in the 
2000s during the administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
and were started in the previous government.43
Today Brazil is one of the largest economies in the world (in 2012, it was 
seventh largest, behind only the US, China, Japan, Germany, France, and 
the UK), the largest in Latin America (its GDP is 40% of the GDP in Latin 
America), and is part of the group of emerging countries known as BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). The Brazilian population, 
with almost 200 million people, is the fifth largest in the world (behind only 
China, India, the US, and Indonesia) and the largest in Latin America (34% 
of the population of Latin America).44 The unemployment rate in Brazil is 
low (5.4% in 2013),45 and there is a very strong social mobility, where the 
poorest segment of society (classes D and E) decreased from 55% of the 
population in 2003 to 34% in 2011. The middle class (class C) increased 
from 37.5% to 54% of the population in the same period, and the 
wealthier classes (A and B) also increased from 7.5% to 12.0%.46
With the dramatic growth of the Brazilian economy, very large 
population, low unemployment, and social mobility, most Brazilians 
are Internet users and cybercrime is now rampant. According to 2012 
data, more than 88 million Brazilians were users of the Internet, which 
accounts for more than 45% of the population.47 In comparison, the 
percentage of the population of Latin American Internet users is 43% 
(which corresponds to 10.5% of the world population of Internet users), 
and 34% of the world population of Internet users. Comparing absolute 
numbers, Latin America had nearly 255 million users in 2012, 32% of 
them Brazilians. North America had nearly 274 million users (78.6% 
of the US population). Another important factor is the increase in the 
percentage and number of Internet users in Latin America—18 million 
people in 2000 to almost 255 million in 2012, which represent 1300%.48 
Given this scenario, with all the economic improvements that have 
occurred over the years, the country is also wrestling with the problem 
of cybercrime. Today, cybercrime is one of the top four economic crimes 
in the world. In Brazil, cybercrime is in second place.49 According to data 
from FEBRABAN (Brazilian Federation of Banks), Brazil had losses of R 
$1.4 billion in 2012 (US $591 million),50 down 6.7% over the previous 
year. It is also important to note that although the absolute number is 
impressive, it represents only 0.06% of bank transactions.51 It reflects, 
among other factors, weak laws and lack of awareness among businesses 
and consumers on this subject. According to the Global Economic Crime 
Survey 2011—Brazil, 40% of Brazilian respondents said they had never 
received any training in cybersecurity, 57% of Brazilian companies said 
they do not have the resources to fight cybercrime or know if they are 
capable of cybercrime investigatations, and 50% of Brazilians said they 
didn’t know that their companies could detect and prevent cybercrime.52
Brazil lived with hyperinflation during the 1980s and into the early 1990s, 
and this reached its peak with inflation of nearly 2,500% in 1993 (Graph 
1),53 the year before the implementation of the Real Plan, which put an end 
to the serious economic problems that plagued the country for so long. On 
this issue of hyperinflation, both the government and the financial system 
were forced to make changes. One of the key changes was that financial 
institutions embraced electronic systems and online banking.54 
According to the 2013 BSA Global Cloud Computing Scorecard, 
because Brazil had been struggling with the cybersecurity issue for a 
while, it adopted modern laws against cybercrime, but most of these 
measures are inadequate. In Brazil, where organized crime is rife and 
laws to prevent cybercrime are few and ineffective, the country is 
becoming a laboratory for cybercrime, with hackers committing crimes 
such as identity and data theft, credit card fraud, and piracy, as well as 
online vandalism. According to the mi2g Intelligence Unit, a digital risk 
consulting firm in London, several notorious groups of vandals and 
Internet criminals originated in Brazil.55
According to the Business Software Alliance (BSA), existing criminal laws 
in Brazil are out of compliance with international standards for digital 
crime. Brazil has gaps in the protection of intellectual property and 
has not signed the WIPO Copyright Treaty, an international treaty on 
copyright law adopted by the member states of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO). Brazil needs to create strong laws to end 
impunity for hackers, promote good data management, and encourage 
the growth of e-commerce.56 This is currently under discussion in the 
Brazilian National Congress through the Marco Civil da Internet, which 
will establish a “constitution” of the global network of computers in 
Brazil, with rights and duties of users and companies.57
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Appendix B: Total addressable market for cybersecurity
Product Areas 2011 2012 2013 % Change 2011–2013
Email Gateway 2414 2447 2622 8.6%
Next Generation Firewall 2249 2721 3217 43.0%
Intrusion Prevention Systems 1890 1859 1906 0.8%
Firewall 2356 2631 2576 9.3%
VPN 941 725 746 -20.7%
Web 1914 1991 2122 10.9%
Total IAM 4019 4418 4860 20.9%
Corporate Endpoint 3225 3447 3692 14.5%
Consumer 4451 4638 4916 10.4%
Vulnerability Assessment 837 916 1008 20.4%
Forensics 221 305 369 67.0%
Proactive Endpoint Risk Management 465 482 506 8.8%
SIEM 1308 1434 1594 21.9%
Policy and Compliance 801 875 962 20.1%
Security Device Systems Management 201 179 166 -17.4%
Consulting Services  4366 4694 7.5%
Integration Services  8109 8529 5.2%
Other Security (2012) 12073 13788 6.9%
Total Security (Product/Services)
Total Available Market 53611 58267 8.7%
Total Security Product Total Available Market 28048 29872 32071 14.3%
Total B2B Product Total Available Market 23597 25233 27155 15.1%
Source: Multiple IDC Security Products and Services reports, 2013. All 2013 figures are forecast estimates.
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Appendix C: Cybercrime as a percent of GDP
Country % of GDP Confidence G20 Countries 
Argentina N/A   
Australia 0.08% M X
Brazil 0.32% M X
Canada 0.17% M X
China 0.63% H X
Colombia 0.14% L  
EU 0.41% L X
France 0.11% L X
Germany 1.60% H X
India 0.21% L X
Indonesia N/A   
Ireland 0.20% M  
Italy 0.04% L  
Japan 0.02% L X
Kenya 0.01% L  
Korea  N/A   
Malaysia  0.18% M  
Mexico  0.17% M X
Netherlands 1.50% H  
New Zealand  0.09% M  
Nigeria 0.08% M
Norway 0.64% H  
Russia 0.10% M X
Saudi Arabia 0.17% L X
Singapore 0.41% M
South Africa 0.14% M
Turkey 0.07% L X
United Arab Emirates 0.11% M
United Kingdom 0.16% L X
United States 0.64% H X
Vietnam 0.13% L
Zambia 0.19% L
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